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Racial Profiling, Terrorism, and Time
Andrew E. Taslitz*
I. Introduction
In the original Star Trek television series, there were at least two
episodes-and I am relying for their content here entirely on my
memory-involving time. In one episode, the crew seems to be losing
control of the bridge of the starship Enterprise. The crew hears a
constant mysterious buzzing sound but can otherwise detect no cause of
their difficulties. It turns out that they are at the mercy of an alien race
that experiences time at a far quicker rate than do humans. The aliens,
let us call them, The Observers, move so quickly that they cannot be seen
by humans, and their alien language is spoken so fast that humans hear it
as little more than a mosquito-like buzzing. From The Observers'
perspective, however, it is the humans, let us call this particular set of
humans, The Actors, who move through life at a snail's pace. Captain
Kirk is the ultimate bridge between the two worlds, being brought into
The Observers' time frame and thus able to experience and understand
both their perspective and the slow-moving and troubled human one.
This proves key because The Observers' have boarded Enterprise and
taken perhaps rash action because they have a need to act quickly, even
by their own standards, to avert disaster for their kind, while Kirk
introduces a more thoughtful, conciliatory alternative less destructive to
both peoples.
In the second episode, there is a living bridge through time into
which a temporarily deranged Dr. McCoy escapes, landing on pre-World
War II earth. His presence there changes the future, ending The United
Federation of Planets that had defined the Star Trek world. Kirk and
Mr. Spock must choose correctly the time period to which McCoy
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escaped because they want to change his behavior there and restore the
future that they knew. They want to favor a particular past as ideal in the
sense that it creates what is, for them, a desirable present.
It is the thesis of this essay that these two Star Trek episodes have
profound lessons to teach about the nature of the experience of time,
lessons with critical importance to critically examining the United States
Supreme Court's jurisprudence on racial profiling. The first episode
teaches us that actors and observers experience time at different rates and
with different degrees of pleasure or pain. Yet, without someone to
bridge the gap, neither actor nor observer can fully understand the others'
perspective, to the detriment of both but, in particular, to the great regret
of the observed. This general observation turns out to be true in the case
of Terry stops-the primary situation in which racial profiling concerns
arise.1 The observers (the police and the courts) experience the time
passing during such a stop as quick and unobtrusive, while the actors
(those stopped) experience the stop as a slow, painful experience in
which they lose control over their lives and their dignity. Indeed, it turns
out that, when the actors believe that racial profiling is involved, the
time-slowing, emotional discomfort-enhancing effects are amplified.
The failure to bridge this gap leads the Court and the police to view
Terry stops, and thus racial profiling, as minor incidents for which there
is relatively little need for constitutional regulation. The episode also
demonstrates the dangers of acting in urgency, for that creates a grave
danger of error. Accordingly, just as the time-quickened aliens acted
badly in haste, when we leave the choice of what to do to the officer on
the beat who must make split-second decisions, we invite trouble. Better
to devise guidelines for his conduct, crafted at an earlier time when we
have the luxury of slow, careful deliberation.
The second Star Trek episode teaches us that what specific times in
our past, and what interpretations of what happened there, we privilege
has implications for our understandings of the present. Again, in the case
of racial profiling, the Court makes the mistake of either being time-
blind-ignoring the past entirely (an impossibility because we always
live in what we experience as an evolving temporal world)--or instead
having temporally-funneled vision, privileging only the past of the
Framers' of 1789 and 1791. But, this article will argue, the past that
1. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Under the Terry rule, an officer may
briefly stop and question a suspect about whom the officer has reasonable suspicion to
believe that the suspect is engaging in current, just-completed, or imminently impending
criminal activity. Moreover, if the officer also has reasonable suspicion to believe that
the suspect is armed and dangerous, the officer may "frisk" the suspect, that is, engage in
a brief pat-down to look for weapons in an effort to protect the officer's safety. For more
on Terry and its connection to racial profiling, see infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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should be privileged is that of the 1860s, for it was then that the
Fourteenth Amendment-which applied the Fourth Amendment to the
states-was ratified. Viewing the Fourth Amendment through a
Fourteenth Amendment lens makes avoiding unwarranted racial
disparities, and thus racial profiling, a central concern of the enterprise of
regulating the police.
In the remainder of this introduction, I will summarize in checklist
form, as background, the high Court's jurisprudence on Terry stops,
ground that is well-worn, and the temporal assumptions underlying it,
thereby entering relatively virgin territory. The rest of this piece will
defend in greater detail, in respective sections, each of the temporal
lessons discussed above and their implications for the constitutional law
of racial profiling. The piece concludes with some observations on the
implications of these insights for the war on terror.
The United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding
constitutional limitations on racial profiling boils down to a few rules:
Rule 1: An officer's subjective racial animus or internal reliance on
racial stereotyping is irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment.
Further, racial stereotyping is so hard to prove under the Fourteenth
Amendment that successful claims are exceedingly rare.
2
Rule 2: Profiles of any sort merely embody police officer experience;
the existence of individualized suspicion in any particular case will
turn on the supportable inferences from all the evidence, including
the experience embodied in the "profiles." This rule is notoriously
ambiguous but does reflect a reluctance to declare profiling good or
bad in general, preferring case-by-case determination, including
concerning the relevance of race.
3
2. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (prior Fourth Amendment
case law "foreclose[s] any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops
depends on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved," and the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment, is the proper basis
for objecting to intentionally discriminatory applications of the laws, such as claims of
selective enforcement based on race); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468-69
(1996) (plaintiffs cannot even obtain discovery in a civil rights suit for intentionally
racially selective prosecutions without first showing that similarly situated defendants of
other races were known to prosecutors but were nevertheless not charged). For further
explanation of the significance of these two cases for racial profiling, see ANDREW E.
TASLITZ & MARGARET L. PARIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 421-24, 441-45
(2d ed. 2003).
3. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 316-20 (synthesizing cases); Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440-41 (1980) (per curiam) (insufficient evidence under the
totality of the circumstances in a case involving an alleged match to a profile to establish
reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (sufficient
evidence for reasonable suspicion given the totality of the circumstances without relying
20051 1183
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Rule 3: Rules 1 and 2 are partly justified by the minimal level of
intrusion upon the individual likely to stem from profiling, for it is a
technique generally used only to justify brief Terry stops upon
reasonable suspicion rather than more onerous detentions, such as
4full-blown arrests, which must be based on probable cause.
This rule is not expressly stated by the Court but must be implied
from case law.
A corollary of Rule 3 is this: Because profiling is only minimally
invasive, and no relevant history suggests the contrary, the problem is
not one worth addressing in a general way in the everyday
jurisprudence governing daily, on-the-street police-citizen
encounters, and doing so would unduly handicap law enforcement.
5
Implicit in each of these rules, I will argue, is a particular set of temporal
assumptions, of attitudes toward the nature and experience of time.
Though I will offer brief comments on each rule, I will focus in
particular on Rule 3 and its assumptions that:
- The experience of time, especially of the present, is conscious and
uniform for all persons;
- The moment of present time of greatest importance is that facing
the officer urgently confronting criminal activity that may be afoot;
on a profile "match," while at the same time recognizing that courts may defer to the
"accumulated law enforcement experience" embodied in the profile).
4. The Court does not state this rule expressly, but it is one plausible way to justify
the Courts' effective constitutional near-deregulation of racial profiling. Why get too
involved in regulating a practice that, in the Court's view, does relatively little real harm?
Cf Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630 n.2 (2003) (suggesting in dicta that some
detentions that are more intrusive than simple Terry stops-such as forcible
transportation to a police station for fingerprinting-are nevertheless so relatively
unintrusive that they can be justified based upon identification warrants supported by
mere reasonable suspicion rather than full probable cause).
5. Again, the Court never explicitly recites this corollary, but it is consistent with
the Court's general tendency to give law enforcement needs great weight, at least outside
the home, in balancing state versus individual interests to determine Fourth Amendment
reasonableness. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From
Elain to the Internment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2264 (2002) ("Nor does the Court,
outside of searches of the home, generally give individuals' interests much weight in the
balance, there being a few important exceptions."); Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and
Suspicion, 48 DUKE L. J. 787, 825-26 (1999) (making analogous point); Tracey Maclin,
The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75
CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1328-30 (1990) (stating that search and seizure protections
generally plummet outside the home); David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion,
Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric Versus Lower Court Reality Under
Terry v. Ohio, 72 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 975, 1018-19 (1998).
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- The Fourth Amendment's past history of creation and enforcement
is irrelevant to profiling, requiring time-blindness about the past; and
- The present experience of time is an individual one, uninformed by
reference to the temporal experiences of other persons, groups, or
communities; this is a corollary of the idea of the uniform experience
of time.
So let's begin by attacking the assumption that the experience of
time is a uniform, entirely conscious phenomenon. We will end by
exploring the implications of these temporal assumptions and of one
additional assumption, namely that the pace of modem life and of
government is ever-quickening, for the war on terrorism.
II. The Experience of Time
A. Why Time Is Not Experienced Uniformly by All Persons
1. The Fundamental Attribution Error
The assumption that all persons experience the passage of time in
the same way is flawed. In part this is so because observers and actors
perceive time passage differently. Those observing an incident view it as
passing more quickly and in a less onerous manner than those actually
experiencing the incident.6 In profiling terms, this means that the suspect
in a Terry stop will find the experience to be longer and more unpleasant
than the officer, the judges, or even laypeople trying to imagine how the
suspect must have felt. The reason for this difference in perception is
what psychologists call the "fundamental attribution error.",
7
The "fundamental attribution error" is the human tendency to
attribute others' perceptions and behaviors to their character flaws and
strengths but our own behaviors to the situation in which we find
ourselves.8 In the classic experiment in this area, students studying for
6. See JOSEPH E. McGRATH & FRANZISKA TSCHAN, TEMPORAL MATTERS IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF TIME IN THE LIVES OF GROUPS AND INDIVIDUALS
178 (2004) (the experience of time is context-bound); infra text accompanying notes 11-
23 (experienced time is perspective-driven).
7. See LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION:
PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4, 126 (1991) (explaining the fundamental
attribution error and its psychological significance).
8. Andrew E. Taslitz, Myself Alone: Individualizing Justice through Psychological
Character Evidence, 52 MD. L. REV., 110 (1993) (defining the fundamental attribution
error). Professor Janice Nadler summarized the findings concerning related
psychological processes thus:
[A]s a general matter, people tend to grossly overestimate the voluntariness of
2005] 1185
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the ministry were assumed by others to be the kind of people more likely
than ordinary laypersons to stop and aid those in need.9 Yet the primary
factor affecting whether future ministers stopped to aid someone
apparently suffering from an illness or injury was whether these
ministers-to-be believed that they were late for class or an important
meeting. Time urgency more than individual character made people into
seemingly less caring individuals.' 0 Correspondingly, many of us have a
self-image of being kind and believe that we would stop to help
regardless of time urgency because we are good people. And we will
judge harshly those who do not stop." Yet the experimental data
suggests that most of us facing time urgency will ignore the plight of
others, exposing our own hypocrisy.
In the criminal justice area this phenomenon plays itself out in
others' actions.... [P]eople are strongly inclined toward explaining another
person's behavior in terms of internal causes (their intentions and dispositions),
while ignoring aspects of the situation that could account for the person's
actions. For this reason, behavior that looks voluntary from the outside can feel
constrained by the situation from the perspective of the actor.
Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, in THE
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2002, 153, 168-69 (2003) (also noting that these conclusions
are based on a "vast scientific literature"); cf EDWARD E. JONES, INTERPERSONAL
PERCEPTION 122 (1990) (though not apparent to observers, "[ilt may be, for example, that
a gentle request in a particular setting is just as constraining, as 'motivating,' as a large
bribe .... ).
9. See Ross & NISBETT, supra note 7, at 48-49, 131 (comparing Darley and
Batson's "Good Samaritan" experiment involving religious seminary students with
Pietromonacon and Nisbett's follow up experiment).
10. Taslitz. Myself Alone, supra note 8, at 110 (summarizing the Darley and Batson
experiment and its implications).
A classic illustration is Darley and Batson's "Good Samaritan" experiment, in
which some students at a religious seminary were told that they were late for a
talk while others were told that they had plenty of time. Both groups passed by
a man slumped in a doorway, groaning and coughing. Only ten percent of the
"hurrying" seminarians stopped to help.... This suggests that the situational
factor of lateness was the most important factor affecting whether the
seminarians would be "good Samaritans."
Id.
11. Id. at I10.
Yet, in a similar experiment, when laypersons were asked how they thought
people would behave, the subjects predicted that the great majority of seminary
students would stop and that being in a hurry would make no difference at all.
They believed very simply that "altruistic people" would help while "selfish
people" would not, regardless of how much time they had on their hands.
Id. (summarizing the Pietromonaco and Nisbett experiment and its implications). See
also Robert J. Wolosin et al., Predictions of Own and Other's Conformity, 43 J.
PERSONALITY 357, 374 (1975) ("Thus, when the degree of influence [of the situation]
shown by others is noted, we see this as relatively large and excessive (even though we
might have been influenced an equal amount). We are thus more likely to make rather
hard moral judgments about those who are 'easily' influenced on the rationale that we
wouldn't have given in to such pressure.").
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numerous settings where observers of criminal investigative techniques
see them as less oppressive than the perception of those subjected to the
same techniques. 12 The starkest example is an experiment by Professor
Daniel Lassiter, who videotaped a single confession from two different
angles. When the camera focused entirely on the suspect, so that viewers
were in the visual position of the interrogator, the viewers fairly
consistently judged the resulting confession as far more voluntary than
when the camera gave the suspect's point of view by focusing on the
interrogator.'3  This result has been replicated in numerous studies
involving widely divergent population samples.' 4 Viewers focusing on
the suspect see little coercion, concluding that the confession stemmed
from the suspect's free choice given his particular personality. 5 Viewers
focusing on the interrogator were pressed to pay more attention to the
aspects of the situation that made it coercive than to the suspect's
perceived personality traits. 
16
Nor does asking viewers to imagine how they would feel and react
in the suspect's situation change these results.' 7  Time and again,
experimental subjects imagine more positive feelings and actions than
they in fact display when placed in the situation. 1 Until viewers actually
stand in a suspect's shoes, they are likely to imagine the experience as
less unpleasant than is really the case.' 9 We perceive time as passing
more slowly, and thus more onerously, when the nature of a particular
event is experienced as coercive or otherwise unpleasant, and vice-versa,
12. See, e.g., Nadler, supra note 8, at 170 ("The general finding that observers do not
reliably appreciate the strength and consequences of situational constraints on an actor's
behavior is robust and has been demonstrated in many different settings, including
police-citizen encounters.").
13. See G. Daniel Lassiter et al., Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilt in the Eye of the
Camera?, in 33 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 189, 201 (Mark P.
Zanna ed., 2001); see generally INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT (G.
Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004) (anthology by leading social psychologists on coercion and
compulsion's presence and effect in police interrogation settings and on the ability of
especially lay observers to evaluate these phenomena accurately).
14. See Nadler, supra note 8, at 170 ("This robust result has been replicated in no
fewer than 15 different studies, using both students and nonstudents, both old and young
people, and with whites, blacks, and Hispanics.").
15. See id.
16. See id.; G. Daniel Lassiter & Andrew L. Geers, Bias and Accuracy in the
Evaluation of Confession Evidence, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT
197, 202-08 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed. 2004) (summarizing all the research studies on this
point).
17. See Nadler, supra note 8, at 171 ("Because people have difficulty imagining
situational influences that constrain choice when such imagining takes place outside of
the situation, people tend to grossly overestimate the voluntariness of even their own
hypothetical actions.") (emphasis added).
18. See id. at 171-172 (summarizing research).
19. See id.
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pleasant experiences seemingly passing more quickly.
20
Moreover, the more attentional effort we devote to analyzing a
situation, the longer it seems to be.2' Perceived duration is also increased
if an event's true duration is not predictable.2 2 The person subjected to a
Terry stop by a uniformed officer does not know how long the encounter
may last. Given the potential consequences of the stop, accusation of a
crime, or at least paying the cost of a traffic ticket, careful attention is
likely to be paid to every aspect of the encounter: the content of the
officer's statements and questions, the choice of responses, the officer's
tone of voice, facial expressions, and so on.23 If the officer is unkind,
using a harsh tone, barking commands, displaying skepticism about your
responses, your anxiety level and thus your attentional effort are likely to
increase further.24
2. Breached Durational Expectations
In a traffic stop, you may have a more structured expectation that
the stop will be quite short, just enough time to issue a ticket.2 5 If it isn't
short-if, for example, the officer asks permission to search your car or
tells you to wait for a narcotics-sniffing dog-time will slow for you
even more because that slow motion is one powerful effect of time
20. See McGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 35-36 ("Negative emotions seem to
increase duration estimation . .
21. See id. at 34.
22. See id. at 35.
23. For a sense of what a variety of Terry stops feel like, especially those involving
perceived racial profiling, see DAVID A. HARRIS, PROFILES 1N INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL
PROFILING CANNOT WORK 1-15, 94-99, 102-15 (2002). Profiling of Arab and Muslim
Americans and visitors in the War on Terror has, of course, proceeded well beyond
simple Terry stops. See Nancy Murray, Profiled: Arabs, Muslims, and the Post-9/11
Hunt for the "Enemy Within, " in CIVIL RIGHTS N PERIL: THE TARGETING OF ARABS AND
MUSLIMS 27, 27-68 (Elaine C. Hagopian ed., 2004) (summarizing the "special interest
arrests," "absconder apprehension initiatives," "watch lists," FBI interviews, "special
registration," "no fly lists," and other mechanisms used to profile Arabs and Muslims in
the post-9/11 world). This essay argues that if the Court assumed that it could stay out of
regulating racial profiling in the pre-9/1 1 world in which its profiling jurisprudence was
forged because profiling was relatively non-intrusive, then the Court was wrong. The
point is even stronger for the profiling of Arabs and Muslims in the new terror war in
which profiling is used to justify seizures far more intrusive than simple Terry stops,
creating an even more powerful reason for the Court to rethink its position.
24. These factors are, of course, those whose presence the Court finds relevant in
deciding whether there has been a Fourth Amendment seizure in the first place, assuming
that a less unpleasant police-citizen interaction is a simple "voluntary encounter" freed
entirely from Fourth Amendment regulation. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 300-
07.
25. See Atwater v. City ofLago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 360, 364 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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durational expectations being violated.26
3. The Impact of Boredom and the Power Trip of Causing
Another's Delay
Even time just spent waiting while an officer runs a computer check
on your registration can be agonizing. While it is stressful, it is also
boring, and boredom further slows the experience of time.27 Indeed,
making others wait for action by you is often perceived as a power-game.
The game is one in which the person waiting is marked as less worthy
and of lower social status than the person causing the delay.28 The sense
of uncertainty about what the officer is doing, whether he will get
incorrect information or make an irrational decision, further heightens
anxiety and retards perceived time passage.29
4. The Group-Individual Experience Connection and Time
Orientation
Perceived time passage is also affected by both individual and group
experience. Members of groups with a strong group identity will
exchange information, often in the form of gossip, in a way that
promotes a shared group sense of the experience of time.3° Relatedly,
"time-orientation" favoring the past versus the present versus the future,
and viewing each positively or negatively, can be influenced by group
membership. 31  African-Americans are particularly likely to have a
negative past orientation, a vision of the past group experience as
26. See MCGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 35 (describing the importance of
breached durational expectations).
27. See id. at 60-63 (describing the effects of boredom on the perception of the
passage of time).
28. See id. at 62; R. Barry Ruback & Daniel Juieng, Territorial Defense in Parking
Lots: Retaliation Against Waiting Drivers, 27 J. OF APPLIED SOc. PSYCHOL. 821, 821-34
(1997) (finding that mall drivers about to leave their parking spaces do so more slowly if
someone is waiting for the spot than if no one is waiting); R. Barry Ruback et al., Waiting
for a Phone: Intrusion on Callers Leads to Territorial Defense, 52 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 232,
232-41 (1989) (finding that those using public telephones have longer conversations
when someone else is waiting to use the phone than when no one else is doing so). For
detailed examinations of the powerful negative emotional, social, physical, and spiritual
impacts of being made to feel lower in social status, see generally, ALAIN DE BOTTON,
STATUS ANXIETY (2004); MICHAEL MARMOT, THE STATUS SYNDROME (2004).
29. See MCGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 35, 61, 78-84 (finding that events
whose onset are unpredictable and whose course of unfolding are perceived as
uncontrollable are most likely to become highly stressful situations).
30. See id. at 40-42, 99-119 (describing the temporal aspects of group identity,
change, and behavior); GARY ALAN FINE & PATRICIA A. TURNER, WHISPERS ON THE
COLOR LINE: RUMOR AND RACE IN AMERICA (2001) (presenting an extended analysis of
how rumors, legends, and gossip promote shared racial group identity and attitudes).
31. See McGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 38-44.
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undesirable, its repetition to be avoided.32 Stories abound in the
community about past unpleasant histories of racial profiling and their
continuing reality in a way that, at least for many African-Americans, is
likely to heighten the expectation of unpleasantness in interactions with
the police, further amplifying anxiety and attention to the details of the
encounters.33 Moreover, these same stories are likely to foster a sense of
expecting the unexpected, thus also increasing the sense of an uncertain
near future that can make experienced time passage come to a crawl.34
5. Time and Data on African-American Attitudes toward the
Police
There is ample statistical and anecdotal evidence about African-
American fears of the police in general. One study found that: 65.8% of
blacks had little confidence that police would treat blacks and whites
equally; five times as many blacks as whites reported experiencing
mistreatment at the hands of the police; and a similar proportion believed
that police racism was very common.35 Another study concluded that
African-Americans are far more likely than whites to express
unfavorable attitudes toward a variety of aspects of policing.
36
Additionally, the author of a 1998 FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin
concluded that there is a greater general lack of faith in the police by
most ethnic minority groups than for whites and that
"misunderstandings" are likely to be the greatest between the police and
racial and ethnic minority group young males. 37 Even the one study most
favorable to the police still reflected significantly greater percentages of
white satisfaction than black satisfaction with their local police.38
Further, blacks satisfied with their local police are probably still
significantly more likely than whites to distrust police in general.39
Additionally, politically active or well-educated minority group
32. See id. at 40.
33. See HARRIS, supra note 23, at 1-15, 94-99 (recounting some of the stories of
African-Americans' experiences with racial profiling).
34. See MCGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 79-80 (noting that anticipated future
stressors whose time of onset is unpredictable and whose course and consequences are
uncontrollable are highly stressful); supra text accompanying notes 19-21 (describing
how negative emotions slow down the experience of time).
35. See Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Race, Class, and Perceptions of
Discrimination by the Police, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 494, 498-99 (1999).
36. Steven A. Tuch & Ronald Weitzer, Racial Differences in Attitudes toward the
Police, 61 PUB. OPINION Q. 642, 642 (1997).
37. See Richard R. Johnson, Citizen Complaints: What the Police Should Know, 67
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 1 (1998), available at 1998 WL 15028978.
38. See STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
AND PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY SAFETY IN 12 CITIES, 1998, at 25 (1999).
39. See Tuch & Weitzer, supra note 36, at 646-47.
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members, who are likely more aware of their rights and of the
community impact of particular police practices, react with a much
greater degree of outrage to police abuses than do whites or less-aware
minority group members. 40 Although some research suggests that lower-
income and lower-education African-Americans and Hispanics are more
willing than others to accept more aggressive policing to keep their
communities safe,4 1 that may reflect desperation more than desire. This
research does not, in any event, change the fact that they may
simultaneously be more afraid of the police and more willing to assume
racially discriminatory treatment by the police than are whites.4a
6. Combined Impact of the Data and Procedural Justice Effects
The combination of all the empirical and anecdotal data suggests a
high probability that an African-American subjected to a Terry stop will
assume either that he is being treated in a discriminatory fashion, in the
sense that a white under similar circumstances would not be stopped, or
that he was stopped based on stereotypical assumptions, rather than solid
evidence supporting serious individualized suspicion, or that both are
true.43 Procedural justice research demonstrates that perceptions of
discriminatory treatment or de-individualized judgments are experienced
as deeply insulting, and produce a sense of outrage.4 4 The two
40. See Weitzer & Tuch, supra note 36, at 494, 500 (finding that better educated
blacks are more likely than less educated blacks to believe in widespread police racism,
though this belief did not vary with income); Tuch & Weitzer, supra note 36, at 646-47
(finding that blacks and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Latinos, develop deeper and longer-
lasting negative attitudes towards the police than do whites after well-publicized police
brutality incidents); Dennis P. Rosenbaum, Civil Liberties and Aggressive Law
Enforcement: Balancing the Rights of Individuals and Society in the Drug War, in
COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 203, 225 (David P. Karp ed., 1998) (finding
that minorities in surveys are consistently more strongly opposed than whites to excessive
use of force by police because of its highly visible nature).
41. See Rosenbaum, supra note 40, at 217-29.
42. See generally Carol S. Steiker, More Wrong than Rights, in URGENT TIMES:
POLICING AND RIGHTS IN INNER-CITY COMMUNITIES 49, 51 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers
eds., 1999).
43. See YUEN J. Huo & TOM R. TYLER, How DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS REACT TO
LEGAL AUTHORITY viii-ix, 35-58 (2000) (explaining that African-Americans and Latinos
are less satisfied with their experiences with the police than are whites, partly because
these racial and ethnic minorities perceive themselves as being treated unfairly by the
police, that unfairness including discriminatory treatment by the police based on race);
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. Huo, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION
WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 62-63, 141-42, 202-03 (2002) (discussing that African-
Americans are more likely than whites to distrust police, including being more likely to
view police conduct as motivated by racial bias than by an individualized consideration
of the specific factual circumstances known to the police).
44. "Discriminatory treatment" here means treating largely identically situated
members of two groups differently based upon some characteristic, such as race,
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understood by the disadvantaged group as largely irrelevant to suspicion of a crime. "De-
individualized judgments" are those judgments made based upon generalizations and
stereotyping rather than upon an individualized assessment of a particular individual's
behavior in a particular context
There is obviously much overlap between these two concepts in many situations.
But they are not identical in all circumstances. For example, an officer might in fact have
solid, particularized reasons to suspect one white person and one black person of similar
crimes. If, however, the officer only questions the black suspect and not the white one,
that would likely be seen by the black suspect and most black observers (and by many
white observers) as "discriminatory" treatment. The reason for this difference in
treatment might be the officer's simple dislike of African-Americans or the officer's
stereotypical belief that African-Americans are more likely to commit this sort of crime.
The latter explanation has an element of de-individualized justice, but that is not the
source of offense, for, in my hypothetical, the officer had individualized reasons
justifying action even without taking race into account yet chose not to act against the
white suspect. The unequal treatment is thus an independent source of outrage from the
de-individualized treatment. Although conscious discrimination might offend yet more
than subconscious discrimination, both types are perceived as unfairly discriminatory.
Correspondingly, a black suspect in a wealthy white neighborhood might be stopped
solely because he does not seem to "fit in" to the neighborhood. Such a stop involves
little, if any, individualized suspicion because the suspect has not been seen as engaging
in any conduct indicative of criminal activity. It is his mere presence in the neighborhood
that is considered suspicious. But it is considered suspicious solely because of the
stereotypical assumptions that blacks are more likely to commit crimes than are whites
and that blacks would not be in a "white" neighborhood unless they were up to no good.
In this hypothetical, there is discrimination in the sense that black presence is viewed as
suspicious and white presence is not. But there is an independent ground of offense in
the absence of truly individualized suspicion. Thus, if the same black suspect were seen
walking back-and-forth outside a closed jewelry store at 2 a.m., repeatedly looking into
the store window, and repeatedly fiddling with the lock on the store door, there would be
individualized suspicion, and no offense would be perceived in the officer's actions,
particularly if he stops white suspects engaging in the same sort of behavior.
Correspondingly, however, a white suspect stopped, for example, on a mere hunch where
no suspicious behavior on his part could be identified and where his whiteness played no
role in the officer's decisionmaking would still feel insulted at being subjected to a stop
for no good reason, that is, no reason supported by individualized evidence of his
wrongdoing. Racial profiling combines both sources of offense-discriminatory
treatment and de-individualized justice.
Given the brevity of this essay, I am collapsing a lot of research into this footnote
and using my own terminology because I believe that I am still capturing the core
teachings of the research in a concise way, a fuller, step-by-step walk through all the
research being beyond the scope of this piece. Also, procedural justice research turns on
perceptions rather than reality (though the two can often be the same), and my
illustrations are meant to capture those perceptions.
Most importantly, perceptions of biased, discriminatory treatment or of de-
individualized, stereotypical decisionmaking each are experienced as insulting, treating
their victims as of lower status than they deserve. See, e.g., Huo & TYLER, supra note 43,
at 55-57 (explaining that "status recognition," and the "authority's regard for the
individual as a full member of the legal 'community," is a central component of perceived
procedural fairness; "neutrality," acting without bias, and making decisions based on
facts, and "benevolence," "the individual's judgment that the authority's motives are
honorable and can be trusted," are the other major components of procedural justice
judgments). However, these three components of procedural justice are not entirely
independent of one another. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 23, at 1-16, 94-128 (discussing
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procedural flaws in combination, especially when perceived as part of a
repetitive pattern, are further understood as socially stigmatizing,
producing psychic pain, decreased respect for the legal system, and a
decreased willingness to obey the law, or at least a lessened willingness
to aid law enforcement.45 Those outcomes can, however, further
reinforce stereotyping by the police, resulting in an ugly cycle of mutual
distrust and insult.
46
Ultimately, African-Americans facing Terry stops are likely to
perceive them as significantly longer and more painful than do observers,
especially distant observers. Distant observers include the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court, who have probably never been in the shoes
of a black Terry-stoppee.47
7. Minority Perceptions and Reasonableness
But why should probable African-American perceptions control?
What if those perceptions are wrong, that is, if racially discriminatory
policing and unjustified Terry stops are indeed rare? After all, the Fourth
Amendment test for the legality of searches is a purportedly objective
one, one of "reasonableness. 48
stigma resulting from biased treatment involved in racial profiling).
45. See, e.g., TYLER & Huo, supra note 43, at 82 (observing that procedural justice
and motive-based trust have a large influence on the voluntary acceptance of police
officer decisions, that is, the willingness to comply with the law because it is seen as fair
rather than because of fear of punishment), 102-11 (explaining that procedural justice
improves legitimacy, which in turn improves law-abidingness in everyday life and the
willingness to turn to state authorities for aid in resolving conflict); HARRIS, supra note
23, at 126-28 (describing psychic pain of racial profiling and its negative impact on
cooperation with the police and thus on crime control and prosecution).
46. See Bernard Harcourt, From the Ne'er-Do-Well to the Criminal History
Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal Law, 66 LAW. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 99 (2003) (describing the process by which race-based policing, even if assumed
to be based on empirically accurate differences in offending by race, eventually leads to
increasingly greater and less justifiable racial disparities). Professor Randall Kennedy
worries about the pernicious effects of profiling on police officer's cognitive processes
and on the supports for a truly democratic society:
By too easily permitting the police to use race as an indicia of suspiciousness,
courts also derogate from the idea that individuals should be judged on the
basis of their own, particular conduct and not on the basis-not even partly on
the basis of racial generalizations. Race-dependent policing erodes the
difficult-to-maintain habit of individualizing persons and strengthens the reflex
of lumping people together according to gross racial categories.
RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 157 (1997). See also HARRIS, supra
note 23, at 107-15, 117-28 (providing more on the mutual cycle of mistrust and insult).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 20-23 (arguing that negative emotions slow
the experience of time).
48. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 169-77 (discussing the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness balancing test).
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A partial answer to these questions is that the accuracy of such
beliefs should be a permissible inquiry in a suppression hearing. Then
evidence of the group impact of broad patterns of police behavior should
be examined to determine whether they have a disparate impact on racial
minorities. 49 Permitting such evidence would be a shift away from the
generally individualist interpretation given the Fourth Amendment by the
Supreme Court to a simultaneous focus more heavily weighted with a
group and community impact-influenced interpretation. 50 The Court has
never expressly ruled out a focus on disparate racial impact, an objective
question, but rather prohibited only an inquiry into the officer's
subjective racial motivations in an individual case.5 '
If an actual disparate impact cannot be shown, that would not
necessarily settle the question because, as I noted concerning the
procedural justice research, widespread perceptions of unjust procedures
can have objective, quantifiable negative effects on the political
community. 52  But evidence showing that there is a racially disparate
impact certainly strengthens the case for unreasonableness. Group
perceptions and reality both matter; the former at least to show the
greater intrusiveness of racial profiling on affected individuals' interests
in privacy and locomotion, the latter to show that those subjective beliefs
are objectively correct and thus "reasonable." In civil rights actions the
pattern and practice focus would also lend further support to applying
systemic solutions in addition to money damages. 53 The media coverage
of systemic wrongs in criminal case suppression motions alone would
throw sunshine on police abuses in a way that would intensify the
49. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 90-91 (2003) (making similar argument in greater detail).
50. Seeid. at 91-94.
51. Seeid.at90-91.
52. Perceived inequalities can do political harm to sub-communities and impose
psychic pain on them while actually decreasing the effectiveness of law enforcement.
See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text. That does not necessarily mean that
unjustified minority group perceptions, those that diverge from reality, should determine
the outcome of Fourth Amendment questions. Often, they should not. But the costs
created by such perceptions certainly should be a factor, sometimes a determinative
factor, in the Fourth Amendment reasonableness balancing process. See Taslitz, Respect
and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 49, at 47-51, 65-80 (discussing hyper versus
hypo-sensitive group reactions and their role in the Fourth Amendment interpretive
process).
53. See Sean Trende, Why Modest Proposals Offer the Best Solution for Combating
Racial Profiling, 50 DuKE L. J. 331 (2000) (extending the analyses of the procedural and
substantive elements of, and obstacles to, civil rights suits based on alleged racial
profiling, including an analysis of potential remedies and suggestions for ways to do
better); HARRIS, supra note 22, at 145-222 (proposing systemic solutions and cataloging
systemic solutions already being tried).
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political forces for positive changes.
54
B. Police Urgency
1. The Dangers of Urgency
Next, the second temporal assumption should be discussed, namely
that the state's interest in the constitutional interest-balancing process is
greater in Terry stops because of the urgent need for action.55 The
problem is that this assumption marks the wrong moment in time as
relevant for judging both the size of the state's interests and the realistic
options available for realizing those interests.
Perceived urgency is a dangerous thing. Intense time pressure leads
to rigid, less adaptive thinking.56 Rather than carefully comparing
alternative courses of action on a wide range of measures, decision
makers may too readily discard options not obviously having the
presumably most-desired attribute.57 In other words, they too easily
narrow their options and their field of attention, ignoring much
information that may help in making higher quality, better-informed
choices. 58 Perhaps even worse, they increasingly rely on well-learned
habits and stereotyping. 59 Time pressure can also create a sense of
54. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Racial Auditors and the Fourth Amendment: Data with
the Power to Inspire Political Action, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221, 258-64 (2003).
55. See Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (outlining the need for urgent, on-the-scene action
to investigate crime as justifying stops and urgent need to protect officers' safety as
justifying frisks).
56. See MCGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 59; Barry M. Stawe, Lance E.
Sandelands, & Jane E. Dutton, Threat-Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavioral: A
Multi-level Analysis, 26 ADMIN. SCIENCE Q. 501 (1981) (discussing how time pressure
reduces the ability to alter and adapt behavior to a new situation).
57. See McGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 59-60 (explaining that time pressure
speeds information processing, resulting in less careful and complete consideration of
alternative strategies for action and the ready discarding of options lacking certain
attributes rather than a careful comparison of the multiple strengths and weaknesses of
the various options before selecting a winning one); Lehman Benson III & Lee Roy
Beach, The Effects of Time Constraints on the Prechoice Screening of Decision Options,
67 ORG. BEH. AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 222 (1996) (explaining that time urgency
leads to less careful consideration of alternatives); John .W. Payne, James. R. Bettman, &
Eric. J. Johnson, The Use of Multiple Strategies in Judgment and Choice, in INDIVIDUAL
AND GROUP DECISIONMAKING 19 (N. John. Castellan, Jr. ed. 1993) (arguing that time
pressure leads to greater reliance on routine decisions).
58. See MCGRATH & TSCHAN, supra note 6, at 59-60 (showing that time urgency
leads to less information processing because of a narrowed field of attention).
59. See id. at 59-60 (explaining that time pressure leads to a "constriction in the
control system," manifesting itself "as a tendency toward dominant, well-learned, and
habituated behavior, regardless of the needs of the specific situations").
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threat, compromising the ability to reason clearly.6 ° Cognitive function
suffers an overall decline in the face of time pressure.6'
The increased reliance on often subconscious stereotypes, the sense
of threat, and the limited ability to gather and effectively assess accurate
information in a time-pressured environment increases the likelihood of
at least subconscious racial stereotyping by the police. Their flawed
perceptions of the likely danger posed by, and guilt of, the suspect lead
to poor judgment by even the most well-meaning officers deciding what
actions to take next as a Terry encounter proceeds.62
2. The Deliberative Alternative
There exist other alternatives. Less time-pressured decisions made
in the proper collaborative institutional environment are likely to be more
deliberative.63 Such decisions stem from hearing more points of view,
collecting more and better information, generating more and better-
considered options, considering how to overcome more obstacles, and
resolving more social and intellectual tensions and confusion.64
The creation of institutions to gather the appropriate data and
carefully craft realistic profiling policies is an achievable goal. The
institutions can guide and monitor officers in making their decisions on
whether and how to engage in Terry stops and can reduce the ill effects
of time urgency on the individual officer actually making the stop.
65
Community-inclusive data-gathering procedures can bring the added
benefit of reducing the group sense of injustice, because a procedure that
gives affected individuals and groups a voice in setting policy is almost
always perceived as more just.
66
60. See id. ("under threat, information processing is altered," including greater
reliance on habitual thinking).
61. See id. at 59-60; cf CARL HONORE, IN PRAISE OF SLOWNESS: How A WORLDWIDE
MOVEMENT IS CHALLENGING THE CULT OF SPEED 12 (2004) ("Instead of thinking deeply,
or letting an idea simmer in the back of the mind, our instinct now is to reach for the
nearest sound bite ... often... [these] insights turn out to be wrong. But that hardly
matters nowadays: in the land of speed, the man with the instant response is king.").
62. These conclusions are but particular applications of the principles revealed by
the time urgency research discussed above to Terry encounters. See supra text
accompanying notes 55-61.
63. See WILLIAM SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL
ACCELERATION OF TIME 81-83 (2004).
64. See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY? 3-63 (2004) (describing deliberative democracy and its advantages);
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, ET. AL., THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 70, at 358 (ed. Garry
Wills ed. 1982) (the "differences of opinion" and "jarring of parties" in elected
legislatures means that "promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a benefit" there).
65. See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 54, at 238-48 (illustrating such policies
and explaining how they work); HARRIS, supra note 23, at 145-222.
66. See Taslitz, Racial Auditors, supra note 54, at 244-48, 264-73.
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Examples of deliberative institutional efforts include statutes
requiring data collection on the extent of profiling in an individual case,
and collaborative efforts like that in Cincinnati. In Cincinnati
representatives of eight inclusive stakeholder groups met to hammer out
anti-profiling policy. Videotaping stops, because the officer knows that
he is being watched, is also another option permitting later deliberation
about any purported error and that may make the officer attend more
closely to the many situational factors that affect how others will later
judge the wisdom of his actions.67
A court might provide incentives for such deliberative reform
efforts by making them relevant to the constitutional reasonableness
balancing process. Courts can be more willing to suppress evidence as
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment on grounds of racial profiling
for jurisdictions that lack deliberative institutional methods for reducing
racial profiling. Where such methods are in place, they would not
provide the police with a safe harbor. But they would provide the state
with more confidence both that its officers are doing the right thing and
that the court will recognize this good behavior.68
C. A Brief Word on Time-Blindness and Privileging A Particular Past
1. The Court's Usual Focus on the Original Founding Moment
I have just enough space left to touch on the idea of time-blindness
and privileging particular pasts. In much of the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, it has privileged the purportedly relevant
"founding moment," namely, the ratification of that Amendment as part
of the Bill of Rights in 1791.69 More precisely, the Court focuses on the
founding moment and the historical events leading up to it.
7 0
2. The Court Usually Ignores the Second Founding under the
Fourth Amendment
The Court has never clearly justified its approach. Given that the
Fourth Amendment was incorporated against the states only by the
Fourteenth Amendment, even an originalist approach would look to
history leading up to that latter Amendment and divining its impact on
67. See id. at 244-48; HARRIS, supra note 23, at 193-95.
68. Cf Erik Luna, Constitutional Road Maps, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1125
(2000) (recommending judicial use of "roadmaps" to guide Congress toward
constitutional legislation).
69. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and the Common Law, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 1739, 1754-60 (2000).
70. See id.
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the Fourth Amendment's meaning." But, as first I and later Morgan
Cloud have argued, the antebellum history is one of massive racial
profiling of African-American slaves and later newly-freed men, who
were routinely subjected to coercive interferences with the sorts of rights
of locomotion, privacy, and property that the Fourth Amendment
protects.72 Moreover, even limiting ourselves to 1791 ignores a matter
about which Morgan Cloud and a number of historians have written: the
religious profiling and roundup of the Quakers without individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing by the rebellious colonies during the
Revolutionary War.73 If, as I believe is correct, we reject originalist
pretensions in favor of viewing all of American history as a source of
lessons on how we should fundamentally "constitute" ourselves, 74 then
other periods of American history, such as the Japanese-American
internment and the fairly recent racial roundup of young African-
Americans in Oneonta NY also must be studied to teach us how to craft
modern constitutional doctrine.75
3. In Racial Profiling, the Court Is Time-Blind about the Past
In the area of racial profiling, the high Court is time-blind, ignoring
all aspects of American history.76 By doing so, the Court ignores the
lessons of over two hundred years of oppressive racially-biased search
and seizure policies and practices and the enormous resulting burdens on
minority communities today.77 Studying the Quakers' plight, the slaves'
suffering, and the Japanese-American internees' effective mass
abduction by the state would illustrate the dangers posed by racial
profiling in a way that the Court's hyper-technical, time-blind
jurisprudence does not. It is time to give the blind Goddess of Temporal
Justice new eyes with which to see.
71. See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 5, at 2268-69.
72. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Slaves No More!: The Implications of the Informed
Citizen Ideal for Discovery Before Fourth Amendment Suppression Hearings, 15 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 709 (1999); Morgan Cloud, Quakers, Slaves, and the Founders: Profiling to
Save the Union, 73 Miss. L.J. 369 (2003).
73. See Cloud, supra note 72, at 374-90.
74. See Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 49, at 53-80
(defending this approach to the use of history in the Fourth Amendment context).
75. See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 5 at 2302-27
(recounting the internment and Oneonta stories).
76. See, e.g., Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (ignoring history).
77. See generally Taslitz, Slaves No More supra note 72; Cloud, supra note 72.
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D. A Brief Word on Time and Terror
1. Terry and Terror
Before September 11, 2001, political momentum was building
toward ending racial profiling.78 Attorney General John Ashcroft had
made a major policy statement condemning the practice. President Bush
felt it necessary to do likewise, pressure mounted for federal legislation,
and numerous state legislatures and police departments were undertaking
their own tentative moves to fix the problem.79 It was becoming a mark
of a lack of academic seriousness for any scholar to embrace racial
profiling as a proper crime-fighting tool.
The declaration of the war on terror changed everything. New
Justice Department policy explicitly embraces the use of profiling in
terror investigations. 80  Conservative, moderate, and even some liberal
commentators now defend some forms of profiling as necessary to
protecting the citizenry's safety.81  Given the perceived greater need
post-9/l1 for quick, Terry-like, on-the-scene action to prevent mass
catastrophe, the association of racial and other profiling with Terry stops,
understood as minor intrusions on liberty, makes it even more likely that
such profiling will escape serious constitutional regulation. Profiling
may be seen as a small price to pay for safety.
This essay has suggested that close attention to the nature of
temporal experience reveals that Terry stops, especially where perceived
racial, ethnic, or religious profiling is involved, are significantly more
78. See Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 45, 46-63 (2003);
David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Revisited: "Just Common Sense " in the Fight Against
Terror? 17 CRIM. JUST. 36 (2003).
79. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS IN PERIL: THE TARGETING OF ARABS AND MUSLIMS
27-250 (ed. Elaine C. Hagopian ed. 2004) [hereinafter TARGETING MUSLIMS].
80. See Department of Justice, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies (June 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/
documents/guidance on race.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005) [hereinafter Justice
Guidelines]. The Justice Guidelines thus ban racial profiling by federal officials
engaging in "traditional law enforcement activities" but "do not affect current Federal
policy with respect to law enforcement activities and other efforts to defend and
safeguard against threats to national security or the integrity of the Nation's borders." Id.
The Justice Guidelines further declare that race and ethnicity may be considered "to the
extent permitted by the Constitution and laws of the United States" when federal officers
are "investigating or preventing threats to national security or other catastrophic events
(including the performance of duties related to air transportation security), or in enforcing
laws protecting the integrity of the Nation's borders." Id.
81. See Davies, supra note 78, at 82-100 (summarizing and critiquing some of the
better-known defenders of racial profiling in the terror war); MICHELLE MALKIN, IN
DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE FOR RACIAL PROFILING IN WORLD WAR II AND THE
WAR ON TERROR (2004).
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intrusive than is ordinarily assumed. Moreover, that intrusiveness has
effects both on individual stoppees and on the broader racial or ethnic
communities to which they belong. The social cost of Terry stops is
anything but minor, and it is much greater still where real or imagined
profiling is involved.
This insight does not necessitate doing away with Terry stops.
Rather, awareness of temporal costs counsels caution and creativity. One
example of cautious decision-making is to be reluctant to easily extend
Terry in practice beyond its original rhetorical commitment to
individualized justice. For example, the Court has concluded that flight
from the police in a high crime neighborhood is sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion.82 Such a conclusion, especially where there are
often alternative, more plausible explanations for the residents of such
neighborhoods fleeing the police, relies on an analysis that is far closer to
a broad generalization than to an individualized judgment of likely
guilt.83 Further, since high crime neighborhoods are often populated by
racial minorities, Terry stops that are too easily allowed, and thus are
likely to be more frequent, may foster the impression that racial profiling
is involved, even when it is not. 84 One example of creativity used to
solve these problems is the sort of deliberative, community-based
experiment in setting Terry policies that Cincinnati has used and was
discussed in a previous section of this essay.
85
Similar caution and creativity should be counseled in the War on
Terrorism. Are Terry stops really the best way to catch terrorists? Does
profiling really help in stopping violence before it occurs and in
prosecuting suspected terrorists? If profiling is necessary, are there ways
to reduce its social costs?
These sorts of cautious questions must be asked. Although I do not
have space here to answer these questions in any detail, others have
persuasively argued that profiling based on race, ethnicity, or religion is
less effective than "behavioral profiling," looking for suspicious
behaviors rather than group membership.86 Avoiding racial profiling in
Terry stops may increase safety while decreasing the social costs of
fighting the terrorists. It is not clear, however, that Terry stops
themselves, even if done free from racial profiling, are likely to turn up
much evidence of terrorists at work given the sophistication of many of
82. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
83. See Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect, supra note 5, at 2299-2302
(analyzing Wardlow).
84. See id. at 2300-02; Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (summarizing empirical data)..
85. See supra text accompany note 67.
86. See HARRIS, supra note 23, at 73-90.
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those involved in terror networks. 7 There may be settings, of course,
where imminent danger and potential harm are so great that the Terry
doctrine makes no sense, such as in the application of the administrative
search and seizure doctrine to permit suspicionless stops and searches of
passengers at airports.88 But that decision is best reached in a
deliberative fashion and justified by a narrow set of circumstances rather
than being used as a wedge further to weaken the Terry doctrine.
2. Slippery Temporal Slopes in the Terror War
Indeed, there are good reasons, some of them temporal reasons, to
worry that allowing the fear generated by terrorism to lead to the
weakening or erosion of some Fourth Amendment freedoms may send
civil liberties tumbling down a slippery slope to a graveyard of
fundamental freedoms. I have explored the justifications for fearing this
slippery slope in the terror war elsewhere. 89 Here, I simply summarize
those arguments:
1. Americans harbor an especially strong belief that they can control
the future. We believe that, like the public stereotype of the pioneers,
each individual can by hard work make for himself whatever future
he desires. If someone fails to achieve that future, the fault and the
responsibility are largely his. Government's primary role is to
protect the physical safety and property rights of each American that
enable each person to achieve her dream of the future. Terrorism
challenges both the bedrock assumption that individuals can control
their future and the confidence that the state can provide the safety
necessary to such control. The result is a constant low-level anxiety
punctuated by outright fear; fear not simply of future physical harm
but of an assault on the very nature of American identity.
2. A variety of cognitive and social forces make it hard for Americans
to accurately predict likely future risks, especially when they are
afraid, leading them to overestimate risks. Further, Americans'
awareness of their limited individual abilities accurately to assess the
87. See id. at 73-90, 139-44 (discussing how to do airport searches the right way);
DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN
THE WAR ON TERRORISM 55-56, 184-85 (2003).
88. See TASLITZ & PARIS, supra note 2, at 361-402 (discussing the standards for
"administrative" searches); Alan C. Calnan & Andrew E. Taslitz, Defusing Bomb-Blast
Terrorism: A Legal Survey of Technological and Regulatory Alternatives, 67 TENN. L.
REV. 177, 208-15 (1999).
89. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Fortune-telling and the Fourth Amendment: Of Slippery
Slopes, the War on Terror, and Predicting the Future (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
90. See id. at 29-38.
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risks of, and to craft solutions for, terrorist threats leads Americans to
defer to the judgment of supposedly more "expert" elites to decide
what costs are worth incurring in the terror war. Yet those elites
might engage in very different cost-benefit analyses than would a
well-informed electorate. Furthermore, elites have an incentive to tip
that balance against civil liberties, an approach that makes politicians
look "tough." This approach promotes an increased sense of safety
(the government is visibly doing something), if not the reality, and
that fits the commonsense notion that more information and
preemptive action will help to forestall catastrophic harm.
9 1
3. The vast speed of modem societal change, especially
technological, political, and economic change, makes deliberation, a
necessarily slow process, harder to achieve, even under pre-9/1 1
circumstances. The greater difficulty of deliberation, combined with
the growing pressure for quick action imposed by the terror war,
leads the supposedly more deliberative branches of government,
namely Congress and the judiciary, to make poorer decisions and to
too readily defer to the purportedly quicker, more energetic decision-
making process of the Executive branch. But the Executive has every
political motivation to indeed move rapidly and to seek the easiest
apparent path to its goals: the increasingly intrusive collection of
ever-increasing amounts of information as a way to prevent terrorist
attacks. Correspondingly, precisely because the Executive is less
deliberative than the other branches, there are fewer obstacles to
Executive encroachments on liberty.
92
The result of these three forces is likely to raise the risk of the ever-
greasier slippery slope toward the virtually untrammeled racial, ethnic,
and religious profiling civil libertarians so fear.93 Indeed, in the case of
Muslims and Arab-Americans, those fears have already come to pass, for
profiling has moved well beyond Terry stops. Muslims are facing
coercive interrogations in their homes or at government offices; being
detained for days at a time for no apparent reason, then released without
further explanation; and facing immigration violation investigations not
focused on other non-citizens present in America, among a wide variety
of other significant intrusions into their lives. 94  The vast majority
detained or questioned are never linked to any terrorist activity.95
91. See id. at 38-41.
92. See id. at 41-45.
93. See id. at 45-48.
94. See Murray, supra note 23, at 29-46 (discussing "special interest arrests,"
temporary detentions, material witness detentions, "absconder apprehension initiatives,"
special FBI interviews, special registration, and other law enforcement efforts aimed at
Arab and Muslim-Americans).
95. See id. at 30-31.
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Distrust of the government is sown, cooperation with that feared
government declines, and an atmosphere of fear of, and intolerance of,
Muslims among the broader population expands. 96 If the Court's current
approach to racial profiling had its roots in a world of Terry stops, those
roots have been overgrown by more vigorous and dangerous forms of
political plant-life, embodied in extended detentions and full-blown
arrests. Similarly, if Terry stops involving racial profiling impose far
greater costs than the Court has generally assumed, then these even more
invasive full-blown seizures will be imposing still greater harms on
American society.
Profiling in the terror war thus calls for far more vigorous
constitutional regulation than the Court has previously permitted.
Ideally, that regulation will include crafting the incentives for other
branches to create deliberative local institutions involving local
communities in setting the terms of engagement and in monitoring the
performance of the police. If a true emergency prohibits deliberative
action, the Court might validate such action only temporarily and on
condition that it be followed by swift movement toward deliberative
review at a later time. The deliberative-incentives model can thus
harness democratic forces to slow or halt the slide down the slippery
slope; to encourage the search for effective alternatives less invasive of
personal liberties and community well-being; and to prod the openness
and debate that is ordinarily understood as giving democracy its ability to
self-correct its mistakes.97  Temporal awareness might mean that the
tradeoff between safety and civil liberties will be seen as a false one. At
a minimum, it is my hope that such awareness, should it come to pass,
will at least lead the Court to see the problem of racial profiling as
significant enough to merit serious attention and to be worthy of
constitutional re-regulation.
Il1. Conclusion
In summary, the Court's current temporally confused Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has led to the constitutional near de-regulation
of racial profiling. With apologies to movie buffs everywhere, it is time
to call in the Time-Cops to clean up the high Court's dangerous and
96. See id. at 27-29; HARRIS, supra note 23, at 91-128, 139-44; COLE, supra note 87,
at 183; DALE MAHARIDGE, HOMELAND (2004).
97. Cf CASS SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 30-32, 54-95 (2003)
(explaining how and why even inadvertent suppression of dissent can lead societies into
error that will either remain undetected or, once detected, will not be corrected).
Professor Sunstein continues: "Freedom of speech provides the key safeguard against
senseless cascades... [a] system of free expression increases the likelihood that when
groups and societies move in some direction, it is for good reasons." Id. at 96.
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temporally ill-informed abdication of its constitutional obligation to
check and balance other branches of government, who may not even be
aware of their irresponsible and deeply harmful behavior.
